To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. GRAHAM (for himself and Mr. MENENDEZ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran established the AMAD Project with the intent
to manufacture 5 nuclear weapons and prepare an underground nuclear test site.

(2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran has advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing serious threats to the security interests of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners.

(3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, Iran, were revealed to the public by the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

(4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.


(6) The United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of and imposed additional sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program.

(8) In September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran, years after construction started on the plant.

(9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly had enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent.

(10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic missile.

(11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten military installations of the United States in the Middle East.

(12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, development, and manufacturing by
the Islamic Republic of Iran, including such efforts occurring after 2003.

(13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency detected radioactive particles, which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.

(14) On June 19, 2020, the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing “serious concern... that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under the Additional Protocol to two locations”.

(15) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile struck an Iraqi military base where members of the United States Armed Forces were stationed, resulting in 11 of such members being treated for injuries.

(16) On April 17, 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity.

(17) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani stated that “Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium by 20 percent and
60 percent and if one day our reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity”.

(18) According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has “between six and eight liquid-fuel ballistic missiles and up to 12 solid-fuel systems” as of 2021.

(19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war game that included conventional navy, army, air force, and air defense forces testing cruise missiles, torpedoes, and suicide drones in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

(20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran commenced a 5-day drill in which it launched a number of short- and long-range ballistic missiles that it claimed could destroy Israel, constituting an escalation in the already genocidal rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Israel.

(21) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels, backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 missiles at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
(22) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air interceptors of the United Arab Emirates shot down a Houthi missile fired at the United Arab Emirates during a visit by President of Israel Isaac Herzog, the first-ever visit of an Israeli President to the United Arab Emirates.

(23) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile, named “Kheibar Shekan”, which has a reported range of 900 miles (1450 kilometers) and is capable of penetrating missile shields.

(24) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which struck near a consulate building of the United States.

(25) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex.

(26) On April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating that there are “serious concerns” about “possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran”.

(27) On May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 pounds, of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon.

(28) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance cameras installed by the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in the country.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Department of State has used evidence of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program to secure the support of the international community in passing and implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;

(2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program, with direct evidence of an active nuclear weapons program prior to 2003;

(3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious
threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;

(4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than cooperative with international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their ability to inspect numerous nuclear facilities across Iran;

(5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs, which are a threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners; and

(6) all possible action should be taken by the United States—

(A) to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capability; and

(B) to protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic of Iran manifested in its missiles program.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.—The term “Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement” means the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.

(3) TASK FORCE.—The term “task force” means the task force established under section 5.

(4) UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM.—The term “unmanned aircraft system” has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.
SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.

(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of State shall establish a task force to consolidate and synthesize efforts by the United States Government to monitor and assess nuclear weapons activity being carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies.

(b) Composition.—

(1) Chairperson.—The Secretary of State shall be the Chairperson of the task force.

(2) Membership.—

(A) In general.—The task force shall be composed of individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of and appointed to the task force by the head of one of the following agencies:

(i) The Department of State.

(ii) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(iii) The Department of Defense.

(iv) The Department of Energy.

(v) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(B) Additional members.—The Chairperson may appoint to the task force additional individuals from other Federal agencies, as the Chairperson considers necessary.
SEC. 6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) REPORT ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the task force, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on nuclear activity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a description and location of current fuel cycle activities for the production of fissile material being undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including—

(i) research and development activities to procure or construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable isotopes;

(ii) research and development of reprocessing capabilities, including—

(I) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
(II) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium targets;

(iii) activities with respect to designing or constructing reactors, including—

(I) the construction of heavy water reactors;

(II) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components, including the intended application of such components; and

(III) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;

(iv) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel fabrication, including—

(I) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual recovery;

(II) recovery processes and ore concentrate production capacity and annual recovery;

(III) research and development with respect to, and the annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
(IV) research and development with respect to the fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium; and

(v) activities with respect to—

(I) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);

(II) conducting research and development on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);

(III) uranium metal; or

(IV) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;

(B) with respect to any activity described in subparagraph (A), a description, as applicable, of—

(i) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;

(ii) the number and location of any enrichment or associated research and development facility used to engage in such activity;
(iii) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent reports, the amount produced since the last report;

(iv) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected assemblies; and

(v) the total amount of—

(I) uranium–235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent purity;

(II) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity and not greater than 20 percent purity;

(III) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity and not greater than 60 percent purity;

(IV) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity and not greater than 90 percent purity;

and

(V) uranium–235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
(C) a description of weaponization plans and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including—

(i) plans and capabilities with respect to—

(I) weapon design, including fission, warhead miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon design;

(II) high yield fission development;

(III) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices; and

(IV) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources;

(ii) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead;
(iii) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a crude nuclear weapon;

(iv) the status and location of any research and development work site related to the preparation of an underground nuclear test; and

(v) any dual-use item (as defined under section 730.3 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or listed on the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group or any successor list) the Islamic Republic of Iran is using to further the nuclear weapon or missile program;

(D) an identification of clandestine nuclear facilities, including nuclear facilities and activities discovered or reported by Israel or other allies or partners of the United States;

(E) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran—

(i) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and
modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; and

(ii) has denied access to sites that the International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during the period covered by the report;

(F) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an undeclared or clandestine facility;

(G) an assessment of activities related to nuclear weapons conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in knowledge due to the lack of inspections and nontransparency of such facilities;

(H) a description of activities between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or persons with respect to sharing infor-
mation on nuclear weapons or activities related
to weaponization;

(I) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise,
or hypersonic missiles being designed and tested
by the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its
proxies, a description of—

(i) the type of missile;

(ii) the range of such missiles;

(iii) the capability of such missiles to
deliver a nuclear warhead;

(iv) the number of such missiles; and

(v) any testing of such missiles;

(J) an assessment of whether the Islamic
Republic of Iran or any of its proxies possesses
an unmanned aircraft system or other military
equipment capable of delivering a nuclear weap-
on;

(K) an assessment of whether the Islamic
Republic of Iran or any of its proxies has en-
gaged in new or evolving nuclear weapons devel-
opment activities that would pose a threat to
the national security of the United States,
Israel, or other partners or allies; and

(L) any other information that the task
force determines is necessary to ensure a com-
plete understanding of the nuclear or other
weapons activities of the Islamic Republic of
Iran.

(3) FORM; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

(A) FORM.—Each report required by para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
form but may include a classified annex for in-
formation that, if released, would be detri-
mental to the national security of the United
States.

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassi-
fied portion of a report required by paragraph
(1) shall be made available to the public on an
internet website of the Department of State.

(b) IMMEDIATE REPORT REQUIRED.—If the task
force receives credible intelligence of a significant develop-
ment in the nuclear weapons capabilities or delivery sys-
tems capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
if not reported before the delivery of the next report under
subsection (a)(1) would be detrimental to the national se-
curity of the United States, Israel, or other allies or part-
ners, the task force shall, within 72 hours of the receipt
of such intelligence, submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report on such development.
SEC. 7. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED
NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS
TO THE UNITED STATES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
submission of the initial report under section 6(a), and
annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic
strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging
with partners and allies of the United States regarding
the nuclear weapons and missile activities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.

(b) CONTENTS.—The diplomatic strategy required by
subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description of efforts of the United States
to counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
project political and military influence into the Mid-
dle East;

(2) a response by the Secretary of State to the
increased threat that new or evolving nuclear weap-
os or missile development activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens and
the diplomatic presence of the United States in the
Middle East;

(3) a description of a coordinated whole-of-gov-
ernment approach to use political, economic, and se-
curity related tools to address such activities; and
(4) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to address such activities.

(c) Updated Strategy Related to Immediate Reports.—Not later than 15 days after the submission of report under section 6(b), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted under subsection (a).